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Fedyszyn and Herrick: Soviet Naval Doctrine and Policy 1956–1986

a nadir today,” Turner calls for “the dissolution of the CIA” as part of “a bold
transformation” of U.S. intelligence.
The 444 endnotes citing interviews,
NARA files, articles, and many books
prove that Turner has maintained a
scholar’s interest in the field he once
practiced. A surprise may be that no
endnote cites John Ranelagh’s The
Agency or any book written by Jeffrey
Richelson—or perhaps Langley’s reviewers extirpated every one of them.
TOM GRASSEY

Naval War College

Herrick, Robert Waring. Soviet Naval Doctrine
and Policy 1956–1986. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin
Mellen, 2003. 3 vols., 1,415 pp. $129.95, $129.95,
$139.95

It is no accident that each volume in
this set comes with Fleet Admiral Sergei
Gorshkov’s picture on the cover. In
fact, the time period encompassed by
this trilogy coincides precisely with the
Gorshkov era—the central figure in all
of the strategic and doctrinal debates of
this study. This massive series is the
capstone achievement of Robert Waring
Herrick, a former U.S. naval attaché to
the Soviet Union and an experienced
student of Soviet navy development.
The subject, the Soviet navy’s growth
from a small coastal force into a balanced force capable of contesting the
United States for command of the seas,
is similarly the capstone achievement of
Admiral Gorshkov, who played a key
role in its development. Appointed
chief of the Soviet navy in 1956, he
took the job surrounded by an armyoriented general staff and the political
leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, who
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was obsessed with missiles and nuclear
weaponry. Over his thirty-year tenure
Gorshkov brought the Soviet navy “into
the world ocean” and seriously challenged American-led Western supremacy at sea. From the official Soviet
perspective, this work dissects the
smaller debates that attended this
growth: coastal versus oceangoing;
offensive versus defensive; submarines
versus balanced fleet; navy nuclear first
strike versus strategic reserve.
If one follows the maxim that “budgets
are strategy,” Gorshkov comes out the
clear winner in his competition within
the Soviet bureaucracy, ultimately building not only a bigger navy, but also a
“balanced” blue-water force. In fact, the
book would offer additional insights if it
managed to relate official pronouncements with actual building programs.
This would lay to rest the speculation
made throughout the book that some of
these official pronouncements were unvarnished reality while others were exaggerations or Aesopian fables in which
the Navy lobbied for forces as projections of Western successes.
The most useful contributions this
study offers are found as Gorshkov
evaluates and assesses the effect of the
growing U.S. Navy during the Reagan
administration. Most notably, Herrick
shows that Western practices were the
foundation upon which Gorshkov built
his navy. The Lehman “Oceanic Strategy” of the early 1980s gave a second
wind to Moscow’s shipbuilding program. Herrick also reveals the complete
disutility of using “dissuasion” as part
of a deterrence strategy with the Soviets. Could a nation ever build a navy so
large that the nearest competitor simply
was dissuaded from trying to keep up?
Reflecting classical balance of power
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theory, Herrick’s evidence persuasively
suggests that there was no single factor
that induced Soviet shipbuilding more
than the fear that America might surge
too far ahead in the naval arms race of
the 1980s. The Reagan “600-ship Navy”
was all the ammunition Gorshkov
needed to lay the keel of his first real
aircraft carrier. Ironically, however,
Gorshkov’s winning campaigns against
the Soviet defense bureaucracy helped
bankrupt the Soviet Union.
This study is designed for the specialist.
It is not easy to read. It is overly long
(1,415 pages)—it quotes, paraphrases,
and synthesizes too many articles and
editorials found in Soviet newspapers
and journals from over the thirty-year
period. Herrick is comfortable in this
terrain and appreciates the way Soviet
leaders conducted their strategic debate, helping the reader to understand
the hidden (and sometimes contradictory) messages they made. He is particularly good at helping readers “split the
hairs” of the debate, noting the shifting
doctrinal priorities from year to year,
which few laymen could discern. However, he repeatedly revisits such central
topics of strategic debate as command
of the sea, homeland defense, and
sea-lane attack. Few readers will have
the patience to follow.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

Hornfischer, James D. The Last Stand of the Tin
Can Sailors. New York: Bantam, 2004. 499pp. $14

James D. Hornfischer writes a gripping
novel of the U.S. Navy’s last major surface engagement of the twentieth
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century. The battle described here is the
engagement between Task Unit 77.4.3
“Taffy 3” under the command of Rear
Adm. Clifton “Ziggy” Sprague and the
Japanese Center Force under Vice Adm.
Takeo Kurta, charged with ultimately
halting Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s
Leyte invasion force. By October 1944
the war in the Pacific seemed well in
hand, yet the Japanese navy still posed
a threat.
From the first line in the book, “A giant
stalked through the darkness,” the
reader is caught up in life onboard a
World War II ship. Hornfischer begins
his story with a desperate Japanese fleet.
The Japanese carrier force is virtually
ineffective because of the severe loss of
planes and, to a greater extent, the loss
of pilots to fly them. The remaining
Japanese strength resides in its battleships—two of the largest ever built,
assigned to the Japanese Center Force—
Yamato and its sister ship Musashi.
Hornfischer describes the battle that
took place in the morning hours of 25
October 1944 between the overwhelming firepower of the Japanese Center
Force and the relatively slow and poorly
armed Taffy 3.
The tone is set with carefully provided
background on the ships of Taffy 3 and
their crew while the combat information centers and radio shacks try to
work out the puzzle of random reports
flowing in. At the same time, a significant portion of American firepower, the
U.S. Third Fleet, under Adm. William F.
Halsey, is rapidly steaming north in
hot pursuit of the remaining Japanese
carrier fleet. This deception move,
which was part of the Japanese strategy,
worked as it was designed—it essentially took Halsey out of the fight.
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